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By Peter Schoenburg and Risa Evans 
In recent years, law enforcement officials 
have honed a new technique for fighting 
the "War on Drugs:" the suspicionless 
police sweep of stations and vehicles 
involved in interstate mass transportation. 
Single officers or groups of officers 
approach unfortunate individuals in 
busses, trains, stations and airline termi­
nals. A targeted traveller is requested to 
show identification and tickets, explain 
the purpose of his or her travels, and final­
ly, at times, to consent to a luggage search. 
As long as "a reasonable person would 
understand that he or she could refuse to 
cooperate," the encounter between the 
law-enforcement official and the traveller 
is deemed "consensual," not subject to 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 
In theory, "consensual" encounters are 
both non-intrusive and randomly applied. 
In practice, of course, they are neither. 
These invasions of travellers' privacy can 
be burdensome and intimidating. As Jus­
tice Marshall noted in his dissent to Flori­
da V. Bostick, officers displaying badges, 
weapons and other indicia of authority 
accost travellers without advising them 
that they are free not to speak to the offi­
cers. On many occasions, the encounters 
occur in the cramped confines of a bus 
during temporary intermediate stops, with 
officers towering between the passenger 
selected for the interview and the bus's 
4
exit. By inconveniencing and intimidat­
ing individuals who use public trans­
portation, "consensual" encounters bur­
den the constitutionally protected right to 
interstate travel. 
The Supreme Court's ready acceptance 
of the burden created by consensual 
encounters marks a troubling societal 
shift away from the promise of individ­
ual liberty. Equally troubling, however, 
is the burden's uneven distribution, 
which marks an abandonment of equal 
protection principles. In theory, the bur­
den created by "consensual" encounters 
is borne equally by all members of the 
society that supposedly benefits from 
these encounters, because law enforce­
ment officers initiate them randomly and 
without articulable suspicion. 
However, as Justice Marshall notes, 
"the basis of the decision to single out 
particular passengers during a suspi­
cionless sweep is less likely to be inar-
ticulable than unspeakable." In practice, 
race often influences or determines an 
officer's decision to approach a traveller 
for an interview. The "War on Drugs" 
means not only an infringement on their 
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liberty to come and go at will, but also a 
denial of equal protection. 
As the Los Angeles riots so poignant­
ly demonstrated, the harm from racially 
discriminatory encounters between police 
officers and individual citizens extends to 
the entire community. In the wake of the 
riots, a nationwide poll showed that 84 
percent of blacks believe they do not 
receive fair or equal treatment in the 
courts. The public's justified perception 
that the criminal justice system discrimi­
nates against blacks and other minorities 
erodes both confidence in the system and 
willingness to rely on it. 
The question of whether race or nation­
ality can be a factor in a law enforcement 
officer's decision to detain an individual 
has, up until now, been raised most often 
at suppression hearings, where defen­
dants who were stopped for investigation 
based partially on their race or racial 
appearance argue that they were detained 
without reasonable, articulable suspicion. 
Unfortunately, this approach has not been 
particularly helpful. While lower court 
cases have not allowed race to be the sole 
basis for an investigative stop, they have 
often allowed it to tip the scales of rea­
sonable suspicion. 
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In the leading case on this question, 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the 
Supreme Court held that the apparent 
Mexican descent of riders in a vehicle near 
the U.S.-Mexican border did not, by itself, 
provide reasonable suspicion for a rov­
ing border patrol to subject the vehicle to 
a Terry stop. The Court did, however, 
allow the appearance of Mexican ances­
try to be a factor providing reasonable 
suspicion in border area stops if other fac­
tors are present as well. Notably, although 
a substantial portion of the defendant's 
brief was devoted to arguing that stops 
based on race violated the equal protec­
tion component of the Fifth Amendment, 
the Court never addressed the issue. 
Unlike investigative stops, there are no 
Fourth Amendment limits on "consensu­
al" encounters. An officer can target any­
one, whenever and for whatever reason 
he chooses. The absence of an informant's 
tip or other information to guide an offi­
cer's discretion invites the officer to base 
his targeting decisions — consciously or 
not — on stereotypes.'^ The Fourth 
Amendment offers no protection to defen­
dants who have been selected for "con­
sensual" encounters based partially or 
even solely on the basis of invidious racial 
stereotypes. Happily, however, the story 
does not end here. 
The Solution: Equal Protection 
Limits On Executive Discretion 
The absence of formal limits on law 
enforcement officers' discretion over whom 
to target for "consensual" encounters is typ­
ical of executive branch decision-making. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
evils associated with "standardless and 
unconstrained discretion." Thus, as the 
Court has consistently recognized, execu­
tive and administrative discretion is limit­
ed by the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Constitution. 
Law enforcement officers may not 
enforce laws in a racially discriminatory 
manner. 
Prosecutors may not consider race 
while exercising their virtually unlimited 
discretion to peremptorily strike jurors. 
Prosecutors may not consider race when 
exercising their similarly unfettered dis­
cretion in deciding whom to prosecute, 
or whether to file a "substantial assistance" 
motion. Nor may they consider race in 
deciding whether to move a defendant 
from state to federal court. Decisions to 
approach certain individuals for "con­
sensual" encounters should be similarly 
subject to the equal protection require­
ment that they not be based on race. 
Apparently, no lower court has direct­
ly ruled on whether equal protection prin­
ciples prohibit race from playing a role in 
"consensual" encounters. On at least three 
occasions, federal courts have approved 
convictions growing from consensual 
encounters in which a defendant was tar­
geted in part because of his race. How­
ever, even as the courts managed for var­
ious reasons to avoid doing justice in the 
individual cases before them, they indi­
cated in dicta that race-based interview 
decisions are constitutionally suspect. Addi­
tionally, dissents in both cases articulate 
clear visions of the equal protection lim­
its on "consensual" encounters. Along with 
Brignoni-Ponce znd Supreme Court opin­
ions about the equal protection limits on 
executive discretion, these cases provide 
a framework for challenging racially-moti­
vated "consensual" encounters. 
In United States v. Taylor,defendant 
Taylor, who was "poorly attired," was 
the only black to emerge in the initial 
group of passengers exiting from a plane 
that arrived in Memphis from Miami. The 
Sixth Circuit decided that because the 
encounter that led to his arrest and con­
viction on cocaine charges was "consen­
sual," it did not need to consider whether 
Taylor was stopped because of his race, 
or whether the incorporation of a racial 
component into the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's (DEA's) drug courier pro­
file would violate equal^protection and 
due process guarantees. However, the 
court apparently recognized the inade­
quacy of this reasoning. Taken to its log­
ical conclusion, the court's reasoning 
would mean that even if police deliber­
ately target ONLY blacks for interviews, 
courts can do nothing as long as the 
encounters are consensual. Thus, after 
announcing its holding, the court noted 
in the next breath that if facts in the record 
indicated that race played a role in the 
"consensual" encounter that led to the 
defendant's conviction, this would give 
rise to "due process and equal protection 
constitutional implications cognizable by 
th[e] court." Specifically, the defendant 
would have to show that: 
[He] was selected for a consensual 
interview because he was an 
African-American, that the law 
enforcement officers at the Mem­
phis Airport implemented a gener­
al practice or pattem that primarily 
target minorities for consensual 
interviews, or that they had incor­
porated a racial component into the 
drug courier profile 
In a thorough and stinging dissent. Judge 
Keith, joined by three other judges, criti­
cized the majority's failure to subject the 
consensual encounter to equal protection 
scmtiny, when the record showed that "[t]he 
only truly objective fact that could have 
given rise to the officers' [initial] suspicion 
was that Taylor was black." "The majority, 
by refusing to address the clear evidence 
of race-based conduct, has endorsed the 
frightening proposition that a defendant's 
subsequent, alleged consent legitimizes a 
governmental practice that violates the prin­
ciples embodied in the equal protection 
clause." Judge Keith pointed out, "the 
majority offers no citation of authority for 
the proposition that race discrimination in 
law enforcement is unreviewable or con­
stitutional." Indeed, as discussed above, 
there is abundant case law to the contrary. 
In United States v. Weaver, the Eighth 
Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that 
he was stopped without reasonable artic­
ulable suspicion of criminal activity, where 
a DEA officer's decision to interview and 
then search the bags of the defendant was 
based partially on his observation that 
Weaver was a "'roughly dressed' young 
black male." The court held that the ini­
tial interaction between the DEA officer and 
the defendant was "consensual," and that 
the officer's subsequent decision to search 
the defendant's bags was supported by rea­
sonable suspicion. 
The defendant had been arrested at 
Kansas City International Airport after arriv­
ing on a flight from Los Angeles. The DEA 
officer testified that he had "intelligence 
information and also past arrest history on 
two black — all black street gangs from 
Los Angeles called the Crips and the Bloods. 
They are notorious for transporting cocaine 
into the B^nsas City area from lis Ange­
les for sale. Most of them are "young, rough­
ly dressed black males. Based on this, 
the court approved the officer's reliance, 
in conjunction with other factors,'" on the 
fact that Weaver "was a roughly dressed 
young black male who might be a mem­
ber of a Los Angeles street gang that had 
been bringing narcotics into the Kansas 
City area." However, just as the Taylor 
court had done, the court in Weaver court 
tempered its holding with an acknowl­
edgment that there are at least some equal 
protection limits on "consensual" encoun­
ters. The court said. 
We agree with the dissent that large 
groups of our citizens should not 
be regarded by law enforcement 
officers as presumptively criminal 
based upon their race. We would 
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not hesitate to hold that a solely 
race-based suspicion of dmg couri­
er status would not pass constitu­
tional muster. Accordingly, had [the 
DEA agent] relied solely upon the 
fact of Weaver's race as a basis for 
his suspicions, we would have a 
different case before us. 
In dissent, Chief Judge Arnold wrote, 
I am not prepared to say that [race] 
could never be relevant. If, for exam­
ple, we had evidence that young 
blacks in Los Angeles were more 
prone to drug offenses than young 
whites, the fact that a young person 
is black might be of some signifi­
cance, though even then it would 
be dangerous to give it much weight. 
I do not know of any such evidence. 
Use of race as a factor simply rein­
forces the kind of stereotyping that 
lies behind drug-courier profiles. 
When public officials begin to regard 
large groups of citizens as pre­
sumptively criminal, this country is 
in a perilous situation indeed. 
Brignoni-Ponce w2iS a Fourth Amend­
ment rather than an equal protection 
case, arising in the context of a Terry stop 
rather than a "consensual" encounter. 
However, the Court's reasons for allow­
ing the border patrol to consider Mexican 
ancestry at all is instructive: 
Large numbers of native-born and 
naturalized citizens have the physi­
cal characteristics identified with Mex­
ican ancestry, and even in the border 
area a relatively small proportion of 
them are aliens. [ ] The likelihood that 
any given person of Mexican ances­
try is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant fac­
tor, but standing alone it does not jus­
tify stopping all Mexican-Americans 
to ask if they are aliens. 
In this paragraph, Brignoni-Ponce provides, by implication, a basis for rejecting race as a factor in decision-making by officials charged with enforcing drug laws. Mexican aliens are, by def­inition, of Mexican descent. As the Court held, there is at least 
some logical correlation between Mexi­
can appearance and alienage. Moreover, 
in the torder area, there is also some actu­
al correlation, however tenuous, between 
the two. Thus, it is reasonable for immi­
gration officials to rely in part on these 
correlations in their decisions about whom 
to stop. By contrast, there is absolutely no 
logical correlation between race and drug 
courier status. Nor is there proven an actu­
al correlation. Thus, there is no reason, 
except invidious discrimination, for drug 
agents to rely on race in deciding whom 
to burden with consensual encounters. 
In the arena of forfeitures, the recent 
case of Jones v. United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 819 
F.Supp. 698, 1993 WL 127094, at *26 
(M.D. Tenn. April 21, 1993) contains a 
helpful equal protection analysis of race-
based airport police encounters. The 
court cites statistics on the racial com­
position of commercial air travelers and 
describes evidence of impermissible 
racial targeting by airport DEA agents. 
Although "deeply troubled" by other inci­
dents (including a DEA airport encounter 
with the black producer of a 60 Minutes 
segment about Mr. Jones' case) the court 
finds no evidence that Jones' encounter 
was racially motivated. 
Litigation Strategy — 
A New Approach Suggested by 
Batson v. Kentucky 
The hurdle that the defense must clear at 
a suppression hearing placed by Taylor 
and the other cases cited above presents 
a daunting challenge. To be able to 
demonstrate, as Taylor requires, that a 
DEA agent relied solely upon a defen­
dant's race as the basis for initiating a con­
sensual encounter is akin to proving 
thought crime. In the same way that pre-
textual traffic stops are difficuk to attack, 
proving that race was the sole basis of an 
encounter will be a difficult task. 
Approaches should include: 
• Discovering the individual agent's 
prior police reports to demonstrate a pat­
tem and practice of consensually encoun­
tering people of color and/or members 
of the underclass. 
• The discovery of plane/train pas­
senger manifests and the interview of other 
passengers to demonstrate the overall 
racial composition of the travelers and the 
disparate number of people of color who 
have been confronted by police. 
• Discovery of any law enforcement 
profiles to flush out de facto racist ele­
ments and characteristics. 
However, before marching ahead with 
the evidence as described above, the court 
should be presented with an alternative. 
The alternative is embodied in the analy­
sis of race-based preemptory challenges 
in Batson v. Kentucky. In Batson, the court 
found that the equal protection clause for­
bids a prosecutor from challenging jurors 
on the assumption that black jurors are not 
impartial. TTie court first recognized the 
societal harm caused when jurors were 
excluded based on race. "Selection pro­
cedures that purposely exclude black per­
sons from juries undermine public confi­
dence in the fairness of our system of 
justice." To require proof by defense coun­
sel of the repeated striking of black jurors 
was rejected as a "crippling" evidentiary 
burden. Instead, the court permitted defen­
dant to make out a prima facia case show­
ing that "the totality of the relevant facts 
gives rise to an inference of discriminato­
ry purpose." The burden then shifts to the 
state to show that permissible selection cri­
teria and procedures were at play. 
Although there is no case law support 
yet, encouraging a judge to adopt a Bat­
son analysis of race-based consensual 
encounters is a critical first step. By per­
mitting a prima facia case to shift the bur­
den, a meaningful review of the reasons 
behind a consensual encounter is possi­
ble. Once the defense has shown that the 
defendant was approached for no other 
apparent reason than his race, the burden 
should shift to the government to articu­
late non-racial factors that precipitated the 
encounter. Without the burden shift, the 
defense faces a Mission Impossible. 
The parallels between the exercise of 
peremptory challenges and the initiation of 
consensual encounters is clear. The same 
assumptions regarding people of color are 
at work in both situations. Race is equated 
with the likelihood of ongoing criminal activ­
ity in the minds of many police officers. The 
societal harm in discriminatory official action 
is equally devastating. A Batson-Vfpe. analy­
sis begins the process of accountability and 
visibility over a police officer's otherwise 
discretionary act. 
As Justice Blackmun pointedly observed, 
"In order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race. There is no other 
41 way. 
If criminal defense lawyers will not begin 
this candid, judicial examination of the 
influence of race on police behavior, who 
will?^^ • 
Notes 
1. Florida v, Bostick, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 
2382, 2384, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 2390. 
4. Id. 
5. The constitutional right to interstate travel is 
fundamental and well-established. See, e.g., Unit­
ed States V. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59, 86 S. Ct. 
1170, 16 L. Ed 2d 239 (1966). Government action 
need not actually deter travel in order to trigger 
constitutional scrutiny. Rather, "[a]ny classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right. 
NOVEMBER 1993 THE CHAMPION 7 
Copyright National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
unless shown to be necessary to promote a com­
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." 
Dunn v, Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339, 92 S. Ct. 995, 
31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1971) (citation omitted) (first empha­
sis added; second in original). 
6. Id. at 2390 (emphasis in original). 
7. Seeid. at 2390, n.l. SeealsoV.S. v. Taylor, 956 
F.2d 572, 581 n.l (6th Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. 
, 113 S. Ct. 404, 121 L. Ed. 2d 330 (1992) (offi­
cer admitted at evidentiary hearing that at least 75 
percent of those followed and questioned in con­
sensual police stops are black); Sheri Lyn Johnson, 
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale 
L. J. 214, 234 (1983) ("Although the DEA has refused 
to commit the entire [drug courier] profile to writ­
ing, the profile clearly contains a racial component"). 
8. Today is not the first time in history that blacks 
have been subjected to this dual deprivation. In 
many parts of colonial America, blacks were required 
to carry "passes." Both before and after the Civil 
War, blacks were barred from entering certain states. 
5eeTracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Loco­
motion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 
Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1260 at n.4 (1990). 
9. "The Trickle Down of Judicial Racism" from 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt's commencement speech 
at Golden Gate University in San Francisco, excerpt­
ed in Harper's Magazine, August 1992, pages 15-17. 
10. See Sheri Lyn Johnson, Race and the Deci­
sion to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L. J. 214, 225-237, 
and cases cited therein. Johnson notes that although 
race — by definition — cannot affect reasonable 
suspicion calculations unless it is statistically relat­
ed to suspected criminal activity, the lower courts 
accept it as a factor without making any inquiry into 
whether there is, in fact, such a relationship. 
11. 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d. 607 
(1974). 
12. For example, consider a detective's testimony 
at a suppression hearing in U.S. v. Lewis, 728 F.Supp. 
784 (D.D.C.), order reversed, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 'When asked by the court why he had 
chosen to approach the defendant, a young black 
male, during a bus sweep, the deteaive said, "There 
was nothing particular I saw in that man, no artic­
ulable thing that I saw that I just walked up to him 
and asked him if I could search him after identify­
ing myself" Id. at 786. 
13. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. 
Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed, 2d. 660 (1979). 
14. Yick 'Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 
S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1866). See also Hall v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 
1978) (police department may not instruct banks to 
target blacks in surveillance photographs, absent a 
proven and compelling state interest). 
15. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 
1712, 90 L. Ed. 69 (1986). 
16. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 
501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1961); see a&o Wayte v. Unit­
ed States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d. 
547 (1985). 
17. 'Wade v. U.S., U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1840, 
118 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1992). 
18. U.S. v. -Williams, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
19. 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 404 (1992). 
20. Id. at 574. 
21. Id. at 578. 
22. Id. at 579. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 582. 
25. Id. at 583. 
26. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S.Ct. 
829, 121 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1992). 
27. The court does not indicate whether the defen­
dant actually raised the issue of equal protection. 
28. Id. at 392. 
29. Id. at 394, n.2. 
30. The officer also relied on the facts that the 
defendant: arrived from a source city for drugs; 
moved rapidly through the airport toward a taxi-
cab; had two carry-on bags and no checked lug­
gage; carried no identification; had no copy of his 
ticket; appeared very nervous when he talked to 
the officer; did not mention that the purpose of his 
travel was to visit his mother until the end of the 
"consensual" interview. Id. at *7. 
31. Id. at 394. 
32. Id. at 394, n.2. 
33. Id. at 397. 
34. The Court did not mention the Equal Pro­
tection Clause once in the opinion. 
35. Id. at 886-87. 
36. The Court supported this analysis in a later 
case. United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
564, n. 17, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1116 (1975), 
noting that apparent Mexican ancestry might not 
be a legitimate basis for stopping people at a check­
point near the Canadian border. 
37. 476 U.S. 79 (1985). 
38. Id. at 89. 
39. Id. at 87. 
40. Id. at 94. 
41. Regis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407, 98 S. Ct. 
2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d. 750 (1978), Blackmun, J., (dis­
senting). 
42. The Christopher Commission's investigation 
of the Los Angeles Police Department reported that 
one-fourth of police officers polled agreed that racial 
bias on the part of officers toward minority citizens 
currently exists and contributes to a negative inter­
action between police and the community. 
"The most practical resource for criminal lawyers," 
says New York's David Lewis 
CHAMPION readers are invited to experience 
BNA Criminal Practice Manual ~ the two-part 
pubUcation frequently hailed from the podium 
during NACDL sessions - as BNA's guest. 
Part 1; Current Reports. Lively articles keep 
you current on developments at pre-trial, trid, 
appellate, and legislative levels, including 
forensic techniques, prosecution trends, and 
other practical matters. 
Part 2: Companion Deskbook. A handy, ready 
reference on procedural, evidentiary, and 
tactical matters researched and written by prac­
titioners. The 2100 pages fusing law and strategy 
include more than 100 lawyer-tested practice 
aids and the chapter cited as "the definitive 
work" on joint defense agreements. Fully 
indexed for easy use and supplemented 
throughout the year at no additional cost. 
To start your no-risk guest subscription, 
phone 1-800-372-1033 or complete this coupon 
and FAX it to 1-800-253-0332. 
YES, I want to receive the two-part BNA 
Criminal Practice lUlanual as your guest for 
45 days. After 45 days, I will accept your 
Invoice for a subscription beginning after my 
45-day guest period at the regular annual rate 
of $585 plus tax, or I'll mark "cancel" on the 
Invoice and BNA will arrange pickup of the 
materials at no cost to me. [TCRM-01 ] 
• I joined NACDL after Jan. 1,1993, so I'm 
eligible for NACDL's 25% new-member 





Phone ( ) 
SIGNATURE 
.Fax(  )  
*we cannot deliver to P.O. boxes. These offers for new 
subscribers only. Current Reports and Deskbook avail­
able separately for $380 per year. 
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 
1231 25th St NW, Washington, DC 20037 
TCRM532C H06 
8 THE CHAMPION NOVEMBER 1993 
Copyright National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
